It seems to me that the Christian view on marriage can easily be lost in the discussion. This view was expressed by Jesus when he said, "What therefore God has joined together, let not man separate" (Mt. 19:6; Mk 10:9, ESV). Note that it says "God", not "the state".

What does this mean? It means that when a couple make their vows to each other, something else is happening. God is involved. God is joining them together. God causes the two to become one.

It means that the state needn't be involved at all. Nowhere in the Scriptures do we read of the state marrying people. (Nor of the church marrying people, in fact.) So, while it is immensely helpful if everyone knows who is married to whom, and therefore for the state to keep records of marriages, the state does not itself join people together in marriage. God joins them together.

But what if the state's definition of marriage is different to God's definition of marriage?

It certainly makes things a bit confusing. Some people might think they are married, when in fact they are not (because God has not joined them together). Or, conversely, some people might think they are no longer married to each other when in fact they are (because God had joined them together, and that hasn't been revoked).

The latter was the case in Jesus' day. The society had introduced "any cause" divorce (Mt. 19:3), where a marriage could be annulled for "any cause", not only for adultery (or other extreme breaches of the marriage covenant). But this wasn't the definition God was using. So what happened if a man divorced his wife (for "any cause") and then married someone else? In God's eyes, he was still married to his first wife, so in taking another wife he was committing adultery against his first wife. So Jesus said, "[W]hoever divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, and marries another, commits adultery" (Mt. 19:9, ESV).

So how should Christians respond to the proposals for same-sex marriage?

For a start, we shouldn't panic. If the state's definition of marriage is wrong, that's not the end of the world. God will still join people together, using his own definition.

But if the state tries to overreach itself, then there could be cause for concern.

For example, if the state thinks its role is to define words, so that it would be illegal to use the word "marriage" with the "wrong" meaning, then that would be very worrying (not least for poor Humpty).

Or if the state thinks its role is actually to educate children (rather than simply to ensure that children have access to a good education), and if part of that state education is to indoctrinate children into a particular view of marriage, then that too would be very worrying.

But in terms of the definition the state uses when it writes a list of who is married to whom, I personally don't see that as too big a deal in itself.

After the cover, the first chapter—What Is a Worldview?—introduces the theme of the book, which is "an attempt to spell out the content of a biblical worldview and its significance for our lives" (p.1). A worldview is defined as "the comprehensive framework of one's basic beliefs about things" (p.2). Everyone has a worldview, which emerges "quickly enough when they are faced with practical emergencies, current political issues, or convictions that clash with their own" (p.4), and "our worldview functions as a guide to our life" (p.5). Unpacking that a bit more, Wolters introduces two key terms that will feature throughout the book: structure and direction. Our worldview tells us how everything is structured, and our worldview tells us about the basic direction things are taking through history.

So what might a biblical worldview look like? We could start with

the basic definition of the Christian faith given by Herman Bavinck: "God the Father has reconciled His created but fallen world through the death of His Son, and renews it into a Kingdom of God by His Spirit."

The biblical worldview presented in the book is one which takes

all the key terms in this ecumenical trinitarian confession in a universal, all-encompassing sense. The terms "reconciled," "created," "fallen," "world," "renews," and "Kingdom of God" are held to be cosmic in scope (p.11).

Now, this might not seem particularly out of the ordinary, but many (perhaps most) Christians would, in practice, tend to limit the scope of these terms. There would be a "sacred" realm and a "secular" realm, where the "secular" realm is perhaps not entirely fallen, not entirely reconciled, or destined to be discarded rather than renewed, and where the "sacred" realm is perhaps something over and above what God originally created. So, in order to distinguish this cosmic-in-scope biblical worldview, it is often called the reformational worldview, partly because it builds on some emphases associated with the Protestant Reformation, and partly because this worldview carries within it the hope that nothing of the created order will be rejected or replaced, but that the entire created order will be—and is being—reformed, renewed and restored: creation regained. (Another way of identifying this view of things is to say that "grace restores nature", p.12.)

The next chapters look in more detail at the components of this worldview, looking at the structure and original direction of things (Creation) and then the story of the shifting direction of things (Fall and Redemption), before unpacking what difference this might make to our lives (Discerning Structure and Direction).

A substantial commentary on one of the synoptic gospels can easily fill its pages by concentrating on questions about the composition of the text and about the details of the historical events themselves, with constant reference to the other gospel accounts.

Strikingly, and refreshingly, Joel Green in his lengthy (928-page) commentary on Luke's Gospel shows no concern whatsoever with these questions. Rather, his overriding aim is to hear what Luke is trying to communicate, within the context of the Old Testament scriptures, and within his own historical and social context.

I've been reading this commentary very slowly for almost a year, mainly for personal reading, but also for a couple of sermons and a few Bible studies. Sometimes it's felt like a lot of reading, but I've never found myself wading through irrelevant material. Instead, I've been repeatedly struck with how rich Luke's Gospel is in its portrayal of Jesus.

So what, for Green, is the message of Luke's Gospel? Throughout the commentary, our attention is drawn back to Jesus' inaugural speech, in which he stated his own mission, "To bring good news to the poor ... to proclaim release to the captives" (4:18). "Poor" is to be understood not simply in material terms, but as those who are socially poor, marginalised, oppressed, rejected, and weighed down by sickness or the guilt of sin, and "release" is to be understood not just as setting free from whatever might hold someone captive, but in terms of full inclusion in the community of God's people, often demonstrated by a communal meal.

This sets the tone for the rest of the gospel, in which Jesus' mission is seen to be diametrically opposed to the way his society was ordered. Those at the forefront of the culture were concerned simply with their own status, and had no room for someone who preached and lived a message that involved losing one's own status for the sake of those on the margins of society. The climax, of course, is Jesus foregoing any status by dying an ignominious death on the cross, in order to bring release, forgiveness and full inclusion to those who were bound by sin.

While reading the commentary, I've been challenged to think about how Jesus would speak to our society. Is his message as diametrically opposed to the way our society functions as it was to the society in which he lived on earth? I think it is. Our society is built not so much on social greed (status), but on economic and personal greed (money and pleasure). But Jesus' message is just as radical, calling us to a total rethink of our whole value system. Once we have received Jesus' welcome and forgiveness, we are to value our resources (including our money) as opportunities to benefit those in need, and thereby to gain true riches in the economy of the age to come, rather than as opportunities to advance our own position in the economy of the present age.

[W]ork is not, primarily, a thing one does to live, but the thing one lives to do. ... A ... consequence is that ... we should no longer think of work as something that we hastened to get through in order to enjoy our leisure; we should look on our leisure as the period of changed rhythm that refreshed us for the delightful purpose of getting on with our work.

The Church’s approach to an intelligent carpenter is usually confined to exhorting him not to be drunk and disorderly in his leisure hours, and to come to church on Sundays. What the Church should be telling him is this: that the very first demand that his religion makes upon him is that he should make good tables.

Summary 1

1. God is perfect.
2. We are not perfect (sin), and we cannot achieve perfection by our own efforts.
3. We will spend eternity either with God ("heaven") or apart from God ("hell"), depending on whether or not our problem (imperfection) has been dealt with.
4. The good news is that God sent his Son, Jesus, to make a way for us to be made perfect. He did this by dying to take away the sins of those who trust in him and by rising from the dead.
5. If we stop trusting in our own efforts and trust in Jesus (if we "repent"), we will be forgiven and spend eternity with God.

Summary 2

1. God created the world so that we would know his love and live in harmony with each other and with the world around us.
2. We do not love God and we do not want to live in harmony with each other and with the world around us (sin), and we can't fix that problem ourselves.
3. At some point, God will sort out all the problems in the world, and we will spend eternity either here on the earth ("earth"), or we will be thrown out ("hell"), depending on whether or not our problem (unloving heart) has been dealt with.
4. The good news is that God sent his Son, Jesus, to make a group of people who will know God's love and live in harmony with each other and with the world around them. He did this by dying to take away the sins of those who trust in him and by rising from the dead.
5. If we receive God's gift of a new heart (if we "repent"), we will be forgiven, and we can begin a life of love here on the earth that will last for all eternity.

Apparently tomorrow is "Not Ashamed Day".

I'm trying to work out whether I should be ashamed of that.

Not Ashamed is a website, declaration, logo, range of clothing and accessories and a host of other things, by which Christians can say that we are not ashamed of Jesus Christ. And quite rightly so. Jesus is very precious to us, and has given us more than we could ever describe, and we sincerely believe that he (and he alone) offers genuinely good news to all people and to the whole of creation.

But it seems that part of the purpose of the campaign is to make sure that Christians are not only not ashamed, but also not shamed. And this makes me uncomfortable.

When we as Christians are persecuted, mocked and marginalised, we are shamed. That is, other people are ashamed of us and of our Lord. And when we suffer such shame, we should rejoice, as our Lord clearly commanded us (Mt. 5:12 etc.), and as his apostles clearly demonstrated (Acts 5:41 etc.). That is what it means to take up our cross and follow the persecuted, mocked, marginalised and crucified Messiah.

Now, it is clear that those in the Not Ashamed campaign are most certainly not rejoicing when it seems that Christians are being marginalised in our country. Why not? Well, this could be because of a deep sadness that the country seems to be rejecting the good news of Jesus Christ. Or, alternatively, it could be because those in the campaign are, in fact, ashamed to suffer shame along with their crucified Lord. I can't tell which it is.

So let's not be ashamed. Not ashamed of the gospel (Rom. 1:16), and not ashamed to suffer shame for the sake of the gospel (2 Tim. 1:8,12,16; 1 Pet. 4:16).

The first two chapters make the case for Christian social involvement, which finds its roots in the character of God, who "upholds the cause of the oppressed and gives food to the hungry" (Ps. 146:7-9, NIV), in the reign of God, and in the grace of God. On the reign of God, "The Bible is the story of God re-establishing his liberating reign over the world", and in the Lord Jesus Christ "The new age of liberation has begun in the midst of the old age of death" (p.26). And on the grace of God, "The more we understand the wonderful grace of God to us in our need, the more our hearts will be open to the poor and marginalized" (p.30). How remarkable then that so much contemporary Christianity in the UK has so little concern for the poor! So often our faith becomes no more than a private faith, having retreated from the public realm centuries ago in the wake of the Enlightenment.

However, social action alone is not enough, because the case for evangelizing the poor is strong. We must consider the priority of the future, and the fact that people have an eternal destiny in the resurrection. So people's most pressing need is the need for reconciliation with God through Jesus Christ. It is important to maintain the centrality of proclamation of the Good News in meeting this need. But what is the relationship between social involvement and Gospel proclamation? Evangelism and social action are distinct activities, but proclamation is central, and evangelism and social action are inseparable, simply because "In our involvement in the lives of others we cannot choose to ignore their social needs" (p.66). The "text" of our Gospel proclamation takes place in the "context" of loving actions and loving community.

Chapter 5 looks at social involvement and the kingdom of God: if there are improvements in social justice, does that mean the kingdom of God is advancing? (This was the thinking behind the 'social gospel' movement of the early 20th Century.) It is true that God has been sovereignly working throughout history, bringing many good things through what is known as his 'common grace', even where people do not acknowledge him. "But the coming of Jesus represented something new: the coming of Jesus meant that 'the kingdom of God has come to you' (Luke 11:20; see also Mark 1:14-15; Luke 17:20-21)" (p.80). So how should we speak of this new work of God? Following the New Testament, we can say that the kingdom comes secretly, not in glory and triumph; the kingdom comes graciously in this present age, and not (yet) in power and judgement; the kingdom comes through God's word, forming a new community shaped by this word; and the kingdom will come in glory, when Jesus once again appears on the earth.

So what is this good news to the poor? First, is is a message of liberation. God's reign of justice and peace is good news especially to those who are enslaved in any way at the present time, whether that is economic, physical, social or spiritual. It is primarily a message about future liberation. "But the new regime has begun among Christ's community of the broken. The Christian community is the place of liberation" (p.87). Second, it is a message of grace: "God's promise of forgiveness and liberation does not depend on our status, education or wealth" (p.97). And, third, it is a message of community: "the coming liberation of God is anticipated in the liberating relationships of the Christian community" (p.97).

But if there is good news to the poor, is there also good news to the rich? There is. The message of Jesus exposes the lie of consumerism, and in its place gives us the good news of Christian contentment. From 1 Timothy 6, this good news is an invitation to find your joy in God, find your security in God, enjoy God's good creation, and live for God's new creation, as part of a gospel-centred life.

Having now "looked at the case for social involvement" in chapters 1 and 2, "how it relates to evangelism" in chapters 3-5 "and to the content of the gospel" in chapters 6 and 7, chapters 8-10 "consider something of the 'how' of social involvement" (p.119).

First, Christian social involvement will be marked by welcoming the excluded. "Poverty as marginalization means that the first responsibility of the church in relation to social involvement is to be the church — a place of welcome and inclusion" (p.137f.).

Second, Christian social involvement will be marked by strengthening the powerless. "Poverty as powerlessness means that social involvement should be about strengthening the weak" (p.138). "Good social involvement involves more than providing for the poor. We want people to regain their God-given dignity as human beings made to contribute to community life. So at the heart of good social action is the participation of those in need" (p.148).

Third, Christian social involvement will be marked by following the crucified Lord. "Often it is assumed that if Christians can get their hands on the levers of power, then all will be well" (p.149). This was the thinking behind "Christendom", and that mindset still continues into the present. But "Christians are called to follow the way of the cross" (p.149). "Christian ministry ... is conducted through the upside-down, unpredictable power of the cross. It is conducted through weakness and dishonour" (p.150). So as the church "gives witness to the good news of the kingdom in this way, it may well be that it is persecuted. The church enters the political realm not to make itself powerful or secure, but to be weak and vulnerable in love; to be in solidarity with those who are weak and powerless" (p.161).

So can we make a difference? Yes, by the grace of God, we can indeed make a real difference. But we need to have realistic expectations. While we seek eagerly and diligently to help the poor, we need to remember that "sin is a universal trait of humanity — both rich and poor" (p.169). The exploited people of today can quite easily become the exploiters of tomorrow. So, as Jesus said, "the poor you will always have with you" (Mark 14:7, NIV).

Only in the eschatological future will poverty be eradicated. But even now within history this future can be glimpsed. And it is glimpsed among those people whose rebellious hearts are being transformed by the grace of the gospel. It is glimpsed in the community in which the rule of God has begun to take shape. ...

We may see reform in society; we may not. The important thing is for the church to witness to the coming liberation of God. We are called to be the jubilee community in which the poor are welcomed, included and strengthened. We are the place of earth where God's future can be seen (p.175-6).

[Jesus] looked up and saw rich people putting their gifts into the treasury; he also saw a poor widow put in two small copper coins. He said, "Truly I tell you, this poor widow has put in more than all of them; for all of them have contributed out of their abundance, but she out of her poverty has put in all she had to live on" (Lk 21:1-4, NRSV).

[J]ust as Jesus indicts the religious leadership for consuming the homes of widows, so now he laments the travesty of a religious system that has as its effect the devouring of this widow's livelihood. Note that in no way does Luke suggest that Jesus finds the widow's action exemplary or praiseworthy. How could he, when the religious system was supposed to care for such as these (cf. Acts 6:1-6), not render them utterly destitute? Jesus' mission is to bring good news to the poor, including this widow, not to impoverish the poor even further (Joel B. Green, "The Gospel of Luke", 728).

For most of my banking life, my choice of bank has been a matter of convenience and cost. If a bank has lots of branches, doesn't charge much for its services, and gives a decent interest rate, that was enough for me.

But I've been increasingly uncomfortable with this. After all, the bank looks after my money, and I am responsible for how my money is used. I wouldn't want my money to be used to make me rich through investing in the manufacturing of weapons for corrupt regimes, through destroying the planet, or through gambling on the food markets and making poor people starve. But I would have had no problem with my bank doing exactly that.

So we're in the process of transferring from Barclays to The Co-operative Bank, largely because of the Co-op's ethical investment policy (and, admittedly, because banking with the Co-op is just as convenient as banking with Barclays). See "The Co-operative Bank Ethical Policy" a few pages into this, or the video below.

I was going to say more in this post, but fortunately Jeremy at Making Wealth History has done the job for me, in a post about Bank Transfer Day (UK version), which is encouraging people to change their bank on 5 November. Will you be one of them?

This was the question posed by Christian philosopher William Lane Craig at the start of his lecture yesterday at Imperial College, London. The title of the talk was "The evidence for God", and it was part of his "Reasonable Faith" tour of the UK. Here's a video of the talk:

Below is an outline of Craig's talk, mostly taken verbatim from his words or his overhead slides. After each point, I give a brief analysis, along with what I think I might have liked to have heard as an alternative. His stated aim was to provide arguments that point away from naturalism and towards belief in God.

1. Why anything at all exists

Contingency argument

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is an external, transcendent, personal cause.
4. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is an external, transcendent, personal cause.

Analysis. The implicit premise (that the universe does not have necessary existence) would not be true if the universe is the "brute fact" of reality, on which everything else depends, and which has and needs no explanation. This argument therefore offers no challenge to the true die-hard naturalist.

Alternative. Many would-be die-hard naturalists do not realise that their view of reality is coherent only if the existence of the universe is a "brute fact", with no explanation. This is worth making clear: just as God is a "brute fact" in the Christian view of things, so is the universe a "brute fact" in the naturalistic view of things. Not everything the naturalist believes can be justified through evidence and reason.

2. The origin of the universe

Cosmological argument

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Analysis. Premise 2 would not be true if the universe is the "brute fact" of reality. If the universe is the non-dependent reality on which everything else depends, then it did not begin to exist. And it makes no sense to use the laws of logic to argue against this, as Craig did for premise 2, because the laws of logic would themselves be dependent on the physical universe for their existence (it is impossible to have more than one "brute fact" of reality).

Alternative. It is worth pointing out that if the universe is the "brute fact" of reality, then what we think of as the laws of logic must have emerged from the physical properties of the universe. So when we think of the impossibility of the existence of actual infinities (one of Craig's arguments on premise 2), that must be showing us the limitations of logical laws in a purely physical universe.

3. The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life

Teleological argument

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
2. It is not due to necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design.

Analysis. Craig did not present water-tight arguments for premise 2, so if I believed that the universe was the "brute fact" of reality, I would not agree with it.

Alternative. It is worth pointing out, as Craig does, that a coherent belief in naturalism will point strongly towards either a theory of everything (which has not been discovered) or towards a multiverse (which has not been observed). The goal of all of this would be to show naturalists where their beliefs take them, and hopefully to make them feel a bit uncomfortable with this, and to show how Christian theism is perhaps more affirming of our everyday experiences of reality.

4. Objective moral values and duties in the world

Moral argument

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
3. Therefore God exists.

Analysis. Once again, the die-hard naturalist would disagree with premise 2.

Alternative. It is worth pointing out that a coherent die-hard naturalist view would be at odds with what we naïvely think to be the case (here, that objective moral values exist), and that Christian theism would be a more comfortable basis for our naïve beliefs about morality. (This does not mean that Christian theism is therefore true!)

5. The possibility of God's existence

Ontological argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being (we call "God") exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. Therefore, a maximally great being exists in the actual world.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
7. Therefore, God exists.

Analysis. This is quite heavy stuff, but it boils down to this: God exists if the concept of logical possibility exists, and if the properties that make God great also exist. But this leaves us with one of two possibilities. Either God is dependent on logical possibility (and plenty of other things) for his existence, in which case God is not God, or God created logical possibility (and plenty of other things), in which case the argument is that God exists if God exists!

Alternative. I think I'd leave this one out.

6. The historical facts concerning the life, death and resurrection of Jesus

1. There are three established facts concerning the fate of Jesus of Nazareth: the discovery of his empty tomb, his post-mortem appearances, and the origin of his disciples' belief in his resurrection.
2. The hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" is the best explanation of these facts.
3. The hypothesis "God raised Jesus from the dead" entails that the God revealed by Jesus of Nazareth exists.
4. Therefore the God revealed by Jesus of Nazareth exists.

Analysis. I think the die-hard naturalist would want premise 2 to read "is arguably the best known explanation". With those changes, the argument doesn't follow.

Alternative. It is worth pointing out to the naturalist that as they approach the supposed evidence for the resurrection, they are not doing so as open-minded enquirers. Rather, their beliefs in naturalism demand that the explanation for the evidence must be a naturalistic explanation. As above, the aim is to show what a coherent naturalistic view of reality looks like, and to show (hopefully) that a Christian view of reality seems to fit more closely with our naïve interpretations of the evidence around us.

7. The immediate, personal experience of God

1. Beliefs which are appropriately grounded may be rationally accepted as basic beliefs not grounded on argument.
2. Belief that the biblical God exists is appropriately grounded.
3. Therefore, belief that the biblical God exists may be rationally accepted as a basic belief not grounded on argument.

Analysis. Before presenting this syllogism, Craig said something like this: "You can know that God exists apart from arguments, simply by experiencing him." I would agree with that.

Overall analysis. There is a lot of excellent material in Craig's presentation. But by presenting his case as a series of logical inferences based on premises that are not self-evident (especially for the naturalist!), I think he overstates his case. Craig does not present a logical argument for God (a cursory reading of the outline above would suggest that he does). Rather, he shows how a consistent and coherent belief in naturalism is at odds with a lot of things that we might naïvely believe (such as the existence of objective moral values), and that Christian theism can lend support to those beliefs. I think this approach is more compelling, and that is why my favourite chapter of Craig's "Reasonable Faith" is the chapter on "The absurdity of life without God", in which he takes this approach. This style of presentation would lead more naturally to Craig's final point, which is basically an invitation for his hearers to investigate further, and to ask God (if he is there) to reveal himself to their hearts.

Photo by James Emery

In Jerusalem, the Dome of the Rock is situated on a famous rock known as Temple Mount. The rock is so called because it used to be the site of the house of the God of Israel, otherwise known as the Temple. It was the wise man, Solomon, who first built this house on the rock.

By Jesus' day, Solomon's house on the rock had been destroyed, and replaced by the second house on the rock, which was then known as Herod's Temple. It was a symbol of hope and security for the Jewish people, who viewed it as a sign of God's presence and blessing. But this house fell (and great was the fall of it) in AD 70, at the hands of the Romans.

Here are some very familiar words that Jesus spoke on another mount:

Everyone then who hears these words of mine and does them will be like a wise man who built his house on the rock. And the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat on that house, but it did not fall, because it had been founded on the rock. And everyone who hears these words of mine and does not do them will be like a foolish man who built his house on the sand. And the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that house, and it fell, and great was the fall of it (Mt 7:24-27, ESV).

I have been living as a Christian in a world dominated by greed.

And yet this hasn't bothered me at all.

I have thought it is perfectly possible to serve both God and money.

I have thought it is possible to preach the gospel faithfully without demonstrating either by what I say or by the way I live that I reject the idols of our age.

In fact, I have thought that challenging or rejecting the idols of our age would be a distraction from preaching the gospel.

I have made myself a worshipper of those idols by seeing my identity as a consumer and my worth in terms of what I consume.

And I have thought that worshipping those idols is okay, so long as I go to church, read the Bible, pray, don't swear very much, and try to be nice to people.

I have thought that God's purposes for the world would be fulfilled by everyone acting according to their own narrow economic self-interest, and I have behaved accordingly.

I have consistently acted with no concern for the poor: today's poor, or tomorrow's poor.

I have used the self-righteousness of some who boast about how "ethical" they are as an excuse for my own indifference as to whether my actions are "ethical" or not.

I have said I believe that the world was created good, and that people were created to steward its limited and precious resources well, and yet lived as though I didn't care at all how quickly or irreversibly those precious resources are used or destroyed.

In fact, I have thought that a society should be measured in terms of how quickly it uses the earth's resources.

I have said I believe that this creation will be restored and transformed when Jesus returns, and yet lived as though the only purpose of this creation was to satisfy my greedy desires.

I have acted in ways that the Bible describes in terms of adultery, thinking I could serve the God of the Bible and simultaneously prostitute myself to gods of money, greed and covetousness.

I'm sorry, Lord.

Please help me to repent.

Please help me to follow you.

(Amen?)

But just in case you want to read it all over again, here's an index to my posts on the respective chapters, written as one very long sentence:

1. All of life is religious, because
2. religious belief is belief about what is unconditionally and non-dependently real
3. (and there are different types of religious belief),
4. and these religious beliefs affect all of our beliefs about all of life
5. (and, by the way, there are other ways of understanding how religious beliefs relate to other beliefs)
6. (including the fundamentalistic approach),
7. for example, our religious beliefs affect our beliefs about mathematics
8. and about physics
9. and about psychology
10. and this whole view of reality is closely linked in with our understanding of the nature of God,
11. [11-13] so we should try to build a view of reality based on a Christian view of God.

This "law framework theory" starts off by recognizing that reality as we experience it has many different aspects, each with its own properties and laws. Then the theory asserts that these aspects cannot be reduced to each other (so psychology is not "nothing but" physics and biology, for example). Instead, each aspect of reality is directly created by God, and depends directly on him for its existence. Here's a provisional list, which is probably best read from bottom to top:

fiduciary
[love-]ethical
justitial
aesthetic
economic
social
linguistic
historical [or cultural or technological]
logical
sensory
biotic
physical
kinetic
spatial
quantitative (p.244)

Next the theory talks about "the natures of things" (p.260). Every thing or entity that exists functions in all of the aspects, whether actively or passively, and is subject to the laws of each aspect. So a rock functions actively in the quantitative, spatial, kinetic and physical aspects, but also functions passively in the other aspects. For example, it might be a stone in an animal's den (biotic), or used in a religious ritual (fiduciary). As such, all entities are described by type laws, defined as "laws which range across aspects determining which properties of different aspects can combine in individuals, and thus determine the types of individuals that are possible" (p.268).

In particular, each type of thing is characterised by one of the aspects (its leading aspect or qualifying aspect), which governs the properties of the thing as a whole.

This is getting a bit abstract, so let's apply it to society.

There are many different communities in society, such as businesses (characterised by the economic aspect), families (characterised by the ethical aspect), religious communities (fiducial), orchestras (aesthetic) and the state (justitial). These communities cannot be reduced to each other, because they have fundamentally different purposes, as described by their leading aspect. Each community has authority to act within that aspect (as in Abraham Kuyper's principle of "sphere sovereignty"), and this authority is derived from God and is subject to the laws God has created for that aspect. So "on this view there is no institution which can rightfully claim to have supreme authority for the whole of human life" (p.291).

So what is the state? It is not the ultimate authority, not even when that authority is given by the majority vote or is restricted by some set of individual rights that the state cannot violate.

By contrast, the law framework theory sees the state as the bearer, not the creator, of the authority it wields in enforcing justice. The will of the majority decides who shall be the bearers of that authority, but the authority itself derives from the law framework of creation and thus, ultimately, from God (p.311).

And what is the state for? It is not for regulating every detail of our lives. Instead,

The state ... has its own distinct kind of authority, an authority qualified by justice — more specifically, public justice. Its ability to carry out justice must extend to the whole of the public within its territory, of course. Nevertheless, its authority is limited to but one aspect of that public. And let me emphasize that it is precisely because justice is an aspect of all individuals and communities, that the state need not subsume them all as its parts in order to exercise its proper authority with respect to them. In other words, state authority need not be elevated above all others on the excuse that it needs totalitarian authority to ensure justice to all individuals and communities (p.296).

It is this kind of approach to reality, based on belief in a God who created the many different aspects of reality that we experience, that can give the state a clear role in wider society, without dominating society, and without being weak and ineffective in operating within its sphere of influence.

But the meat of the chapter is a fascinating discussion about the nature of God.

First, we have the view developed by Augustine, Anselm and Thomas Aquinas (the "AAA view" for short). Under this view, "God's attributes all exist necessarily, and necessarily God has them all" (p.202). This view encourages reductionism in theories: trying to explain things in one aspect of reality in terms of their dependence on some other aspect of reality, for example, explaining psychology in terms of biology and physics. It encourages reductionism

precisely by holding that certain kinds of properties and laws found in the cosmos exist necessarily and are uncreated [in the sense of not being wholly dependent on God] while others are not. For if some properties and/or laws of the cosmos are created [dependent on God] while others are not, then what could make more sense than to theorize about creaturely reality by looking for the ways its contingent properties and laws depend on those that are uncreated? Indeed, how could it be avoided? (p.212)

The problem with the AAA view is how to explain how God's attributes (say, his justice) can exist necessarily without God thereby becoming dependent on them.

For if there is even one abstract property that (on the AAA view) would have to exist independently of God and which God would have to possess to be God, then not only is that property rendered divine per se, but God is thereby debarred from that status (p.210).

Another apparently insurmountable problem is that

according to the AAA position, God's attributes (goodness, justice, or power, e.g.) exist as necessarily and are as uncreated as He is and are shared (in a lesser degree) by humans. The difficulty with this is that humans are thereby made to be (partly) divine because the qualities humans share with God would have to be as uncreated in us as they are in God (p.210).

In contrast, the view of God that Clouser advocates is one which, apparently, "to this day [2005] has no voice whatever in philosophy of religion in western Europe and North America" (p.223), but is one which "was elaborated by the Cappadocian Fathers of the Greek Orthodox tradition, rediscovered in the west by Luther and Calvin in the sixteenth century, and championed by Karl Barth in the twentieth century" (p.203), labelled as the Cappadocian and Reformational position (the "C/R view" for short).

Under the C/R view, "everything found in the cosmos [has been] created by God" (p.213). After a survey of relevant biblical passages, Clouser concludes:

So I find the evidence to be that the Bible is not silent on whether anything is uncreated other than God, including numbers, sets, properties, relations, laws, propositions, or any of the other denizens of Plato's barnyard. None can be regarded as uncreated (p.217).

But this goes further than theory-making, because

Bible writers simply do not allow for exceptions, not even for the attributes ascribed to God Himself (p.217).

Clouser explains:

So while this view affirms that God really has both the relations to creatures and the qualities that scripture ascribes to Him, it insists that He did not have to have them to exist. Rather, they are true of Him because he freely willed them to be, and to subject Himself to laws and norms He also called into being, all so as to accomodate himself to our creaturely limitations (p.218).

Having seen how these different approaches to theory making are tied in to different views of the nature of God, and having seen that the AAA view (and its associated reductionism in theory making) is less coherent and less biblical than the C/R view, the stage is now clear to begin to construct a non-reductionist view of reality, which is the subject of the remaining three chapters.

According to Roy Clouser, in The Myth of Religious Neutrality (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), psychology has often tended to choose one or the other of these answers. In terms of Dooyeweerd's aspects (see here), if psychology is the study of the sensory aspect, then psychologists have tended to reduce the sensory aspect either onto the physical and biotic aspects, or onto the social aspect. This often reflects the psychologists' beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality (their religious beliefs). Let's treat each in turn, followed by a different perspective.

1. Psychology reduced to physics and biology. Clouser describes the "behaviourist" approaches of Watson, Thorndike and Skinner, with this summary:

Common to all these theories is the total rejection of allowing into psychology anything about human mental life and experiences that is prima facie non-behavioral such as thoughts, feelings, purposes, and even perceptions (p.166).

Why might these theorists take such an approach?

The reason is their materialist perspective on reality ... that sees all reality as restricted to, or dependent on, the physical aspect. That is, it holds either: (1) there exist only physical bodies and their actions, or (2) any non-physical factors involved are entirely generated by physical bodies and their actions. (p.167).

2. Psychology reduced to sociology. Under this heading would come the theories of Adler and the earlier theories of Fromm (who later moved towards a more pantheistic view of reality).

Adler insisted that psychology is a social science. He held that the goal of psychology "is not to comprehend causal factors, as in physiology, but the direction-giving ... [social] forces and goals that guide all other psychological movements" (p.171).

3. Non-reductionist psychology. The Christian perspective on reality that Clouser presents in his book is one in which God has made creation with its various aspects, and the different aspects cannot be reduced to each other. This view of the whole of creation reflects the biblical view of human nature, in which "each human is ... seen as an essential unity, no matter how many diverse kinds of functions an individual may display in the various aspects of creation" (p.180). Importantly, "this view is at odds with the notion popular among theists that a human is not an essential unity but a duality of two entities—a soul and a body" (p.181). What such a non-reductionist theory might look like in practice will the subject of later chapters.

But first, a few of my own ruminations. If in a particular area of study we are aiming to focus on a particular set of related properties that things possess, and to identify and explain the ways in which those properties relate to each other, then I suppose that our religious beliefs (our beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality) could affect what we think about the following:

1. The properties themselves. If our beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality lead us to believe that certain properties that things appear to possess are merely illusions, then we're not likely to bother to study those properties in great detail. In other words, our religious beliefs could influence what we think are the legitimate boundaries for a discipline.
2. The laws relating those properties. If properties appear to relate to each other according to some law, then we might not believe that to be the case if our religious beliefs contradict that. (I suppose this would only happen in the scholastic or fundamentalist ways of relating religious beliefs to other beliefs.)
3. The explanations for the laws. It is not enough simply to identify the laws relating different properties. Far more important is to explain those laws. This is something that Clouser emphasises. We tend to explain laws by proposing the existence of some entity: an entity hypothesis. But what is the nature of that entity? Does it possess properties that would have relevance for other areas of study? Do my beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality allow me to believe that such an entity could exist? This was dealt with in Chapter 4 (and I think it's going to feature quite heavily in the monster-chapter 10).
4. The purpose of the discipline. This point and the previous point both touch on how the discipline relates to the rest of reality. Why would I bother spending my time researching a particular area? Which particular questions are interesting to me? Why should people give their money to fund research into that area? What is important for people to do with their lives? What are human beings for? While this might not influence the details of the discipline itself, it clearly has a large effect on the broader features of the discipline and its place in society.

Anyway, back to physics. Atomic theory, to be more specific. Clouser takes us through three major theories about atoms, from the twentieth century, showing how the religious beliefs of their proponents guided them in formulating their views. Note that the differences are all of kinds (3) and (4) above, in that religious beliefs constrain the kinds of entities proposed to explain the laws (about which there was general agreement), and in that they guide the interpretation of physics as a whole.

1. The theory of Mach, who "did not believe that atoms exist", seeing them rather as "useful fictions" (p.149).  He and others took so seriously the distinction between the world as it is and the world as we experience it that they "concluded that so far as we can ever know from our experience, reality is made of sensations" (p.150). This reflected Mach's own beliefs about what is fundamentally real. In his own words: "The assertion, then, is correct that the world consists only of our sensations" (p.157). In collapsing all of reality onto the sensory aspect, he was taking the same approach as that of John Stuart Mill towards mathematics, which we saw last time.

2. The theory of Einstein, who "believed that we are entitled to say there are (purely) physical objects outside our minds which cause our sensations, while Mach denied it" (p.152). In terms of Dooyeweerd's aspects (see last time), "he attributed independent reality to the logical and mathematical properties and laws" (p.152). And belief about what is independently real constitutes religious belief.

3. The theory of Heisenberg, who asserted, contrary to Mach and Einstein, "not only that elementary particles lack any sensory qualities, but that it is not even accurate to say they have being". "Instead, he holds the view that they are essentially mathematical possibilities" (p.154). "For Heisenberg [atomic theory] meant postulating micro-entities that comprise reality and that, while composed of physical energy, are essentially mathematical in nature" (p.157).

So what difference does this make? As in (4) above, religious beliefs help researchers to decide which questions are worth addressing. "For example, on Mach's view it would make no sense to attempt to confirm the existence of entities such as atoms and subatomic particles" (p.156). It would probably be fair to say that the neutrino would not have been discovered if physicists had generally held the religious belief that all of reality is purely sensory.

The great expense and effort highlights the motive which drove the physicists involved. Clearly, the motive was the belief that theories are attempts to know reality; that is, theories try to discover what exists and to know its nature. My point it that this belief presupposes a philosophical perspective which would have to accept (minimally) the logical, mathematical, spatial, physical, and sensory aspects of experience as (at least part of) the nature of reality. So whether that view was consciously adopted by those thinkers or not, it is the sort of perspective on reality that science needs. It needs, and is most benefited by, a view of reality that openly accepts its multi-faceted nature (p.157).

But if everyone's beliefs about everything are shaped by their own religious beliefs, as has been claimed, then that must include mathematics.

Chapter 7 of Roy Clouser's The Myth of Religious Neutrality (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) faces this challenge head-on: how do religious beliefs affect mathematics?

You (both of you) may recall the basic shape of the argument. Religious beliefs are beliefs about what is independently and unconditionally real (Chapter 2). And our beliefs about what is fundamental about reality will affect the kinds of hypotheses we will entertain when we are thinking about any particular area of reality, including mathematics (Chapter 4).

Here are some examples.

1. The Number-World Theory (Pythagoras, Plato, Leibniz). In this theory,

the numerals and other markings of mathematics stand for real entities in another world or dimension of reality (p.133).

In order for this to be true,

it would have to be the case that the quantitativeness of things relates to the other kinds of properties and laws true of them by being utterly independent of them all. Thus, the quantitative aspect is (at least part of) what things and their other kinds of properties depend on for existence (p.134).

The quantitative aspect as one of the aspects of our experience mentioned in Chapter 4, and is one of fifteen aspects identified by Herman Dooyeweerd. (The full list given in Clouser's book is: fiduciary, ethical, justitial, aesthetic, economic, social, linguistic, historical, logical, sensory, biotic, physical, kinetic, spatial and quantitative.)

Examples of the practical difference these religious beliefs have had on mathematics have been the resistance of the Pythagoreans to the idea of irrational numbers, and that of Leibniz to the idea of negative numbers.

There are more practical differences when we consider the intuitionists (Brouwer, Weyl, Poincaré), who make even the logical aspect to be dependent on the quantitative aspect. This forces them to deny "the existence of actual infinite sets" and therefore to "reject an entire branch of mathematics, the theory of transfinite numbers developed by Georg Cantor" (p.141).

2. John Stuart Mill, whose "theory was that numerals symbolise sensory perceptions" (p.134).

Mill defended this view of math[s] by arguing that not only the quantitative aspect, but all other aspects of our pre-theoretical experience are actually identical with its sensory aspect. That is, Mill's theory was that the nature of all reality is sensory (p.134).

This approach is similar to the number-world theory in selecting one (or two) of the aspects, and asserting that it is the non-dependent reality on which all of the other aspects depend.

3. Bertrand Russell, who took the logical aspect to be non-dependently and unconditionally real:

The logical laws, he says, are not only those to which all reality — actual or possible — must conform, but they are "the heart and immutable essence" of all things (p.144).

Thus mathematics "is nothing other than a short-cut way of doing logic" (p.135).

4. Instrumentalism, e.g., John Dewey, for whom the physical-biological aspect(s) have the non-dependent and unconditional reality:

through all his theorizing, he regards all other aspects as dependent on the physical-biological and never regards them, in turn, as dependent on anything else (p.144).

Under his theory, "humans are to be understood as essentially biological beings struggling to survive in a certain environment", and thus "all human cultural products are instruments" (p.136), helping us to survive.

Just as it is inappropriate to ask whether a hammer is true or false, it is equally inappropriate to ask that of mathematical tools. 1 + 1 = 2 is thus neither true or false, says Dewey, though it performs certain tasks well (137).

5. Belief in God, "which should lead us to the view that no aspect of creation is self-existent, nor does any generate any other since all are dependent on God alone" (p.145). Under this view of mathematics,

the abstractions we arrive at, numbers, sets, etc., will never be seen as independently existing realities. The are never more — or less — than the properties, relations, functions, etc., of the quantitative aspect true of the things and events of ordinary experience (p.146).

In summary, it would have been good to explore the practical implications of these different views more fully. While all of the views differ greatly on their understanding of the nature of mathematics, it is so far clear only in the cases of the number-world theory and of intuitionism that any specific theories of mathematics are affected by one's religious beliefs. But, for example, if I switch between the theories of Mill and of Russell, would I then be forced to change my beliefs about any specific theories of mathematics?

But I think enough has been said to demonstrate the point: that religious beliefs do indeed exert a controlling influence on mathematical theories.

First, I might take a scholastic approach (see yesterday's episode), by which I formulate my theories of geology just as any other geologist would, but at the end of the process I whip out my Bible and check for any inconsistencies. If necessary, I do some more digging and some more theologising until those inconsistencies disappear (which hopefully they will).

Or, second, I might take a fundamentalist approach. This is the subject of Chapter 6 of Roy Clouser's The Myth of Religious Neutrality (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). In this approach, I scour the Bible for anything it might say about geology, and explicitly include that information in my theories.

Despite some rather strong language, Clouser doesn't seem to have a fundamental problem with either of those approaches, per se. (His main problem with the fundamentalist approach is when the Bible is misinterpreted, and forced to speak on matters about which it doesn't actually speak.) These two approaches

[focus] on either the logical compatibility of specific religious beliefs and specific theories [the scholastic approach], or on the inclusion of biblical teachings in the content or confirmation of theories [the fundamentalist approach]. But while not denying that revealed truth can, at times, act as "control beliefs" for theories in those ways, this position [see below] denies that those are the only or most important ways divinity beliefs impact theories (p.127).

This third position is the radically biblical position, which we encountered last time. In this, the religious beliefs control other beliefs by acting as presuppositions:

By acting as a presupposition to all theory making, rather than by being part of, or by confirming part of, the content of any particular theory, belief in God can guide every theory and do it in a more pervasive and important way (p.121).

The next chapters form a "casebook", giving examples of how this works in mathematics, physics and psychology. So watch this space...

So far (1, 2, 3, 4) in The Myth of Religious Neutrality, Roy Clouser has been arguing for a view of the relation between religious belief and theoretical reason as follows (p.96):

Religious Belief

1. guides and directs the use of reason in all of life

Theoretical Reason is:

1. not neutral because controlled by religious belief
2. not final court of appeal
3. not able to decide all matters

In Chapter 5 he now labels this as the radically biblical position, saying

The position is this: there is no knowledge or truth that is neutral with respect to belief in God. The [Bible] writers who assert this do not also specify exactly how belief in God impacts "knowledge of all kinds" or "all truth," but they are clear that they regard beliefs in other (putative) divinities as partially falsifying all that is taken to be truth or knowledge, and that knowing God enables us, in principle, to avoid that partial falsehood (p.94).

He then quotes some biblical texts and concludes

that the cumulative effect of these texts is to teach that no sort of knowledge is religiously neutral (p.95).

However, most people throughout the history of thought have taken different views on the relation between religious belief and theoretical reason.

2. Theoretical reason controlling religious belief

First, there is the view that reason is autonomous and "trumps" religious belief. This may be religious rationalism, which "was the dominant influence in ancient Greco-Roman culture" (p.94). In this view, reason can be used either to justify or to refute religious beliefs. In some ways this may be seen as the reverse of the radically biblical position (p.93):

Theoretical Reason is:

1. neutral respecting all matters
2. final court of appeal in all matters
3. able to decide all matters (?)

Religious Belief is:

1. a theory or conclusion of reason
2. optional

(Closely related to this is religious irrationalism, which states that religious belief is completely isolated from theoretical reason.)

3. Religious belief and theoretical reason in harmony

When the radically biblical position clashed with religious rationalism, religious scholasticism emerged, which

devised a compromise between the all-encompassing claim pagan rationalism made for reason, and the equally all-encompassing biblical claim that right faith is a necessary prerequisite for knowledge of every sort. This was done by limiting the scope of each claim (p.99).

This position "had permeated the whole of European thought by the sixth century" (p.104), and "Among thinkers who believe in God, [it] is still by far the most popular position in the world today" (p.105). Diagrammatically, it looks something like this (p.101):

Realm of Supernature or Grace

Faith accepts revelation as supreme authority concerning God and the soul and related matters.

Natural Realm

1. Reason is neutral and final authority concerning nature;
2. Reason harmonizes religion with the theories of science and philosophy;
3. Reason proves the existence of the supernatural and systematizes revealed doctrines.

4. Faith and reason post-1500

The change in Western thought came

in the sixteenth century when scholasticism was simultaneously challenged by two movements. One of these, the Renaissance, advocated a return to pagan rationalism by insisting on the autonomy and neutrality of reason in all matters, so that it dispensed with faith imposing any limit to reason. The other was the Reformation, which rejected limiting faith to only supernatural matters and argued that reason is intrinsically guided by faith in all matters (p.105).

Calvin was strongest on the latter point, taking "the view that human reason is not neutral because it is affected by sin, where sin is understood as false divinity belief which produces deleterious effects on reason's attempts to interpret reality" (p.106).

However, the Protestant church soon sank back into scholasticism, having a "general view of the relation of faith and reason [that] was largely the same" as that of the Catholic church.

Their main difference over faith and reason came to be that while Catholic thinkers tended to harmonize their faith with theories about nature derived from Aristotle (due to the influence of Thomas Aquinas), Protestant thinkers felt free to harmonize their faith with whatever theories about nature were currently fashionable (p.107).

So where is the radically biblical position today? It does have its adherents, but generally doesn't have a good press, "owing to the specific interpretation of it which has been advocated by the largest single group of its adherents, the fundamentalists" (pp.108f), to whom (or against whom) the next chapter will be devoted.